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Bronaugh: Lost Opportunities and Contract Damages

LOST OPPORTUNITIES IN CONTRACT DAMAGES
Richard Bronaugh*
Many opportunities are lost merely through a failure to be nimble or to pay attention when it matters. However, my interest is in
opportunities lost for a very different kind of reason. Because of a
contract that I make, I omit to do other things that probably would
have been as good, or even better. Of what relevance is this to contract damages? Lawyers often speak as if the quantum of damages
is affected, or at least they declare that lost opportunities are an
aspect of harm relevant to the justification for awarding any
damages in a breach of contract case.' Lost opportunities are an important element in the analysis of reliance in a famous paper, which
I will be discussing, by Lon Fuller and William Perdue. I shall state
flatly at the outset that I think lost opportunities are much overrated. Reaching this conclusion requires following two paths. The
first seeks a basis to influence the amount of contract damages.
Should the ungained values of optional worlds be cited on the list of
harms that a contract breach has caused? The second path is to ask
whether or how the fact of lost opportunities could help justify the
award of any damages for the breach of contract.
I make a contract with a Christmas tree wholesaler for one
thousand trees. I expect to sell them before the holidays. The contract is made six months prior to the delivery date in November,
but there is a breach against me, and the trees are not delivered.
Before this event, several different things happened, all of which I
might have described as missed, forgone, or lost opportunities. The
question is whether they constitute any special harm, serious
enough themselves to attract the harm principle and the attention of
the court.'
Consider these possibilities: (1) There were various
wholesalers of Christmas trees from whom I might have made my
order for the trees. I received several offers. The seller I chose was
not the cheapest, but I felt the greatest confidence in him at the
time. As it turned out, ones I passed by delivered to their retailers
without default. I say that I missed several good opportunities when
I signed with the man I did. Is there harm in the fact that there
*

Professor of Philosophy, Talbot College, University of Western Ontario.
1. That lawyers have spoken and do speak as I suggest I merely assert. This
essay is a logical analysis and I have not attempted to link the ideas here to any line of
cases.
2. The assumption upon which I am proceeding is that courts act to remedy
harms to litigants; that they should do so is what I mean by the harm principle.
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were more reliable persons with whom I had a chance to deal?
Before trying to answer that question, let me tell some more.
(2) After contracting, but before the breach, I had become
uneasy about my wholesaler. I could not yet claim anticipatory
breach, but I considered placing a small order with someone else
just to make sure I'd have some trees, even at the risk of more on
the lot than I could sell. I also considered insurance. I decided
against these measures. I thus forwent, one can fairly say, certain
opportunities for self-protection. Is that a contribution to the harm
that does result? I believe that this matter can be dealt with summarily, unlike the prior situation and the ones to follow. These "insurance" measures (while they involve making contracts) are not
lost opportunities. When lawyers refer to opportunities, they mean
alternative contracts to the one that is actually made, or perhaps
some other form of activity
(3) Prior to the breach while still hopeful, I heard of "giveaway" wholesalers. Curious, I made some inquiries but found that
they no longer existed; I was too late. (4) Or, having made my contract I simply attended to other things, ignoring the rumors, and
failed to find an extraordinary opportunity just around the corner.
Are evaporated or unpursued possibilities things one has lost? If
one can miss an opportunity that was never a living option in one's
mind, then the matter of opportunities has an "objective" side. I
shall in fact treat this as a plausible notion. The following at least is
true: in an environment where other contracts were possible, I
neglected or forwent a serious investigation of the chance to find an
alternative to my contract. Given the breach against me, did I suffer
added harm?
(5) As I prepared to open my tree lot, I received an offer to
participate in a time-sharing scheme for a vacation condominium.
Here is an offer I would describe as an opportunity that I am unlikely to see again at such a price. There was, alas, a sense of missing
3. It should also be understood that I am not discussing anticipated contracts
or "opportunities" that will only be possible given a performance by my initial cocontractor and which are lost because of a breach I suffer. That is a problem of
remoteness, so far as the award of damages is concerned. Another situation falling outside of my discussion is this. Once there is a breach of contract, I may be forced to fill
my tree lot with more expensive trees, purchased in the crush of the last days before
the holiday. This may indeed cause me to reflect upon past offers. They were rejected
then, but look good now. Interesting and typical though these retrospections are, the
fact of such losses cannot incre.ase the quantum of damages, for reasons that will
become clear in the text.
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something good, for I felt I was unable to respond to it. Is this loss a
harmful one, especially given that I will suffer a breach? Should an
award of damages reflect this loss?
(6) A cheaper wholesaler found me. His offers became progressively more attractive (almost tortious) as time went on. I actively resisted this temptation, saying that I have my bargain, such
as it is. I suffer a breach. Merely saying now that I should have
waited for the cut-rater is a variation on the bargaining theme in
situation (1): variously, I might have done better. Do sour grapes
count? More to the point, I say that I could have taken delivery on
the spot from this.man, and then set myself to refuse the upcoming
delivery under my antecedent contract. Is part of the harm I suffer
to be found in the fact that another better deal actually would have
existed had I been willing to breach?
What might be learned from these small tales? There is a
breach of contract, and people are given to think of what might have
been, as if missed opportunities are part of the harm suffered from
the breach. What generally is lost opportunity? What's the harm of
it? In the first situation above, I lost or forwent opportunities as I
bargained. In the remaining cases, because of the existing contract,
I refused or missed some choices within and without the tree
business. But not every avenue is an opportunity; not every unchosen option is a loss of opportunity. If one's commitment seems
best-or no other one seems much better-then there need be (and
one hopes there will be) no sense of loss as one views the options,
past or present. "Lost opportunity" is an expression of regret. In
this light, let me continue.
(7) Situation (1) could have differed in an interesting way. In
my search for wholesale Christmas trees prior to contract formation,
I encountered a local monopoly. When I contracted for the wholesale
trees, I did not see myself as passing by any options, a fortiori no
opportunities either. They did not exist. When the monopolist (who
had oversold his capacity) fails to make delivery to me, there are no
forgone opportunities that float in retrospective view. Is this a case
in which one contracts but forgoes no opportunities? There is no
occasion for regret.
Yet one need not be so narrowly confined. The monopolist is in
competition with alternative uses of my resources. There is a distinction between content-opportunity and value-opportunity which
has a bearing here. Although the monopolist closes off my contentopportunities in the field of Christmas trees, if I sold ornaments
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before the holiday I might achieve an equal or better value gain. I
did miss that when I contracted with the tree monopolist. It
represents a value-opportunity through another content-opportunity
not closed off. Although extreme situations may occasionally arise, it
would seem to be the way of the world that there is an equally
valuable or better opportunity to any commitment that one makes.
Regret is always possible. This is undeniably a commonplace if objective value-opportunities are counted. The consequence is that
there is some value lost (I do mean net loss) in any choice one
makes, unless one gets (or perhaps is) that beyond which no greater
can be conceived. Now if losing any opportunity for net gain is
harmful as such, then every single commitment is in fact a harmful
thing. There is born in the act of choice by a sorrowful humanity the
occasion for a lifetime of regret. Here is the case without end for
state attention and moral anxiety. Is this the justification for the
human inclination to cite in the face of a broken promise the forgone
opportunities of a bygone time? If this thought seems attractive, it
is well to notice that these losses of opportunity are not the result
of a breach of promise. These so-called harms result even as one's
co-contractor performs perfectly. But then the loss of opportunity
seems hardly to be an item of damage. The most a breach would
seem to do is stimulate the lament over what might have been.
These reflections can be refined as follows.
There are opportunities lost in the process of entering a contract: for by one's act a boat is missed, taken by another, or simply
gone. But not all such "non-normative" losses, as I shall call them
hereafter, are inevitable, for one could accept an offer with no opportunities drying up anywhere. While old opportunities remain
viable (though untaken) or fresh opportunities perhaps emerge, the
sense in which they are lost is normative or juristic. One believes
that they cannot be taken for the reason of one's commitment otherwise. I am bound not to take them, so they are lost to me. What is
one to make of this idea when a breach occurs? What is one to say
to or about those victims who complain that they could have
grasped old or new opportunities had they been willing themselves
to breach, in some sense, antecedently? Consider the loss through
normative belief first, and non-normative second.
Is a person harmed specifically by the fact that he did not free
himself by breach in order to "capitalize" on something available
after contract formation? Does harm compound because the victim
neglected to beat the other to the punch? Such a straightforward option existed in the situations, where I ignored rumors, where I did

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol17/iss4/6

1983]

Bronaugh: Lost Opportunities and Contract Damages
PERSPECTIVES ON CONTRACT

not invest in the condominium, and where I resisted pressure. I
think one here must distinguish between eschewing opportunism
(which is what occurred) and losing opportunities. The law could not
conceivably consider the former as an extra kind of compensable injury. The fact that I did not capitalize is also the fact that I did not
breach. A steadfast victim has forborne to use breach to seek a gain,
he does not suffer an added harm. The point is this, citing the
superior opportunities one could have realized as a contract-breaker
is of limited relevance. It amounts to no more than saying that one
has fulfilled one's side-under certain circumstances. Of course, not
having breached is a fact, foremost among several, that is certain to
secure to one the right of recovery against the defaulting side. But a
forbearance to breach opportunistically cannot generate added
damages against another beyond the loss of the value-expectations
already experienced from the breach.
What now of non-normative opportunity losses? Evaporations, I
have contended, are commonplace; they are indeed inevitable if one
recognizes opportunities of which one was unaware. Should any of
these losses be thought sufficiently harmful to deserve compensation? About the "objective" ones, no court will examine an unknown
or unoffered possibility as an item for which compensation should be
calculated. For how could a defendant rightly be made to pay to the
plaintiff some amount against a parallel course of action outside the
contract and unknown to the plaintiff? That notion is unworthy of
further consideration. But what of the real offers that the defendant
rejected or could have pursued? Does the victim here show some additional harm beyond the plain loss of expectation from the actual
breach? I think that a firm answer to this question can now be
given.
To advance the argument to its end, consider that I have five
options in what may be called "my bargaining environment". One of
these options is unknown to me (if I may be allowed to say so) but
this "objective" option is quite an extraordinary value. There are,
therefore, four real options, each of which has come before me as an
offer. Assume that a relevant comparative measure of the value of
each of these can be given. I am aware of these values, and reject
one as no good for my purposes. Of the remaining three, two are of
equal value for practical purposes (which value of course should be
discounted by a measure of the probability of its realization). One offer is superior, but unaccountably I do not accept it. (If I had accepted the superior offer, I would have missed no opportunities except the extraordinary "objective" one.) The offer I did accept, of
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course, came from the defendant, from whom I am now seeking
some compensation for the opportunities I lost, as well as for my
loss of expectation.
I discover at once that the court does not wish to hear of that
extraordinary possibility of which I myself only lately became
aware. Also, no one need hear of the inferior offer I rejected, for it
does not speak to the loss of any opportunity. But it does remain in
my hands to cite the superior offer that I rejected or the equal offer
I passed by in making the contract that I did. With respect to the
known superior offer that I did not take, an award in excess of the
value of the defendant's promise must be demanded. It would follow
that the defendant is to compensate me for more than the deal we
made. Since he cannot be required to do that, the citation of a
superior offer is irrelevant. (Even if' exemplary damages were introduced into the theory of awards so that the defaulter will pay
more, it would not be plausible to justify this punishment on the
ground that either there were probably some better bargains
available to the plaintiff or, in the face of emergent opportunities,
the plaintiff was in fact no opportunist.) However, I remain free to
describe all practically equivalent opportunities that I forwent.
These severally could have had a lower cash result for me but better probability discounts, producing equivalence. Where does this
bring me? Being practically equal in worth, there is nothing in the
remaining pair that is significantly greater or less than the original
expectation value of the promise I got. Referring to them would
seem irrelevant to the quantum of damage.
The argument is easily summarized. (i) There are opportunities
that one misses as one contracts. Some of these the plaintiff had rejected at the time; they may only now come to be regarded in hindsight as opportunities. Others were missed because the plaintiff did
not know of their availability. But, in any case, by making a contract
one forgoes (in the normative act) all alternative options and opportunities whether one knew of them or not. The question is whether
any of these should be cited as a matter for damages. The unknown
surely cannot be. But should the plaintiff be allowed to cite the offers he did not pursue or that he rejected outright? One must ask to
what purpose. Citing an inferior or equivalent option could at best
leave damages alone, at the level of the expectancy from the actual
promise of the defendant. No more than that could be claimed. Only
citing some superior opportunity will possibly affect the quantum of
damages. Will it? This question cannot be answered by deciding that
harm is truly suffered in such a manner. The difficulty is in requir-
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ing the promisor to pay damages beyond the expectancy of the promise. There would seem to be no basis in contract law to assign to
the counter-breaker that added responsibility. (ii) There are opportunities that one forgoes because one already has contracted and
also there are opportunities that evaporate after one has contracted.
In the former case, one eschews opportunism and leaves alone interesting possibilities for the reason of one's normative or juristic
commitment. To seek damages in light of one's forbearance to
behave opportunistically, however, is only to seek damages in the
light of the fact that one has performed one's own side of the contract. So no added damages make sense. When options, latterly, are
just no longer in the field of view, for whatever reason, they are lost
in a non-normative way. In the case of evaporated opportunities the
same argument applies from the (i) section: only a superior option
could make a quantitative difference and it must demand of the
defendant more than he had promised to give, as if he is required to
pay on a promise that he did not make. I must conclude that lost opportunities cannot affect the quantum of damages.
(iii) The person who points to opportunities missed, forgone,
or lost has a point to make. A message emerges. The plaintiff
stresses the avoidable character of the harm he has experienced-so
long as he does not turn to objective opportunities. He says that
there were more reliable persons than this defendant with whom he
might have dealt. He heightens his status as a victim. When there
are post-bargain opportunities forgone, he calls attention to the fact
that he could have breached to advantage. He has been steadfast
while the other has not. The message is a way of insisting on one's
rights and of placing one's present claim in a favorable light. In a
word, the appeal to missed opportunities is rhetorical.
Unless one is prepared to force the defaulter to pay more than
the value of his promise, the loss of opportunities is irrelevant to
the quantification of damages in contract. But conclusion (iii) may be
premature or insufficiently developed, even if (i) and (ii) are
established for good. Can the fact of lost opportunities help justify
the practice of awarding damages for a breach of contract, even if it
is irrelevant to the quantum of damages? Or is its use rhetorical?

In 1936 Lon Fuller and law student William Perdue, Jr.,
published the first installment of "The Reliance Interest in Contract
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Damages."' The whole essay has become one of the most respected
legal studies, and as a landmark or signpost it has meant many
things to many people.' Fuller and Perdue reach, as I shall be explaining presently, a conclusion rather like my (i) and (ii) concerning
the quantification of damages, but they perceive a potential for
"divergence of measure and motive," noting "that it is impossible to
assume that when a court enforces a promise ... the purpose or interest which forms the rationale of the court's action necessarily furnishes the measure of the promisee's recovery."' The measure of
recovery in contract is, of course, the promisee's expectation. It
would appear then that there is an interest called the "expectation
interest." Satisfaction of that interest, it might naturally be thought,
is achieved by an award of damages that fulfills the promisee's expectation. But it is "not at all far-fetched," as they will seek to show,
that in the background is another interest. That interest is the
reliance interest, the satisfaction of which dominates in the light of
justice any interest there might be in pure expectation.
Before discussing the Fuller-Perdue theory of the 'motive' for
contract damages, however, I want to discuss their analysis of the
'measure,' that is, their theory of the quantum of damages. Indeed,
though the authors express some caution about lost opportunities as
an item of damages, they do allow for it: ". . if some considerations
of policy were conceived to exclude from compensation 'the lost profit' on a contract to marry, the same consideration would, no doubt,
affect also a claim for a generalized and undefined loss of other opportunities to marry, but it would not necessarily carry over to a
claim for the loss involved in turning down a specific proposal of
marriage."7 Their suggestion is that the difficulty about compensation for lost opportunities (to marry) is simply one of general policy.
The problem is worse than that, as in fact their own analysis will
reveal.
Having three suitors, when Jill accepts the proposal of Jack,
she necessarily forgoes the proposal of the rich John. The proposal
of impecunious Jake can hardly be thought an opportunity at all.
4. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE
L.J. 52 (1936).
5. Professor P. S. Atiyah writes: "In many respects, this article has been the
starting-point for the whole of this book." P. ATIYAH, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 1 (1979).

6. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 4, at 66.
7. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 2, 46 YALE
L.J. 373, 417 (1937).
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The engagement is long, during which time John tries once more
and then marries another. Meanwhile, Jack grows wary of Jill and
he breaches his promise to marry her. Jill sues Jack. Jake remains
available but is of no interest to her. If she can cite the loss of her
chance to marry John, and be rich, as an item of contract damage
then in theory Jack could have quite a problem.
Fuller and Perdue recognize the problem. It was fundamental
to my prior conclusion, (i) and (ii), on the irrelevance of lost opportunities to the quantum of damages. There is an excess of reliance
interest over the expectation. To force Jack through an award to
make Jill rich (Jill being unwilling to "mitigate" with Jake) is to permit "the plaintiff to shift to the defendant [her] own contractual
losses, when the defendant is guilty of nothing more reprehensible
than breach of contract."8 Jill, on their theory, had entered a losing
bargain for which Jack (who had no control of John's ardor or Jill's
disdain) should not be made to pay extra. To solve the problem
Fuller and Perdue set forth a "formula," roughly: in a suit grounded
on reliance, damages should not exceed the money needed to put the
plaintiff in the position she would have occupied had the contract
been fully performed.' The formula means that when the amount of
money needed to make one whole again exceeds the valueexpectation under the contract, the latter value will limit the
amount of the award. But this is a telling principle. What are its implications for Jill? Quite frankly, it means that her lost chance to
marry rich John is as irrelevant as the proposals of poor Jake.
The terrain is now familiar but it deserves a brief survey. Lost
opportunities are either practically equivalent or superior to the actual contract value. A genuinely inferior option, while it may be
relevant to the mitigation of damages, is not a lost opportunity.
Jill's only forgone opportunity in reliance on Jack's promise occurred when John made his final try. She did not rely twice, once initially as she contracted (though Fuller and Perdue would say she
did), and then later.'" If Jill is harmed by her loss of Jack (her expectation), is she additionally harmed by her loss of John (her opportunity)? The answer is not difficult, for on the Fuller-Perdue formula, whether or not the lost opportunity is "harmful," it will not af8. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 4, at 78.
9. "We will not in a suit for reimbursement for losses incurred in reliance
on a contract knowingly put the plaintiff in a better position than he would have occupied had the contract been fully performed" Fuller & Perdue, supra note 4, at 79.
(Italics in original).
10. I shall argue for that point below.
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feet the extent of damages. If compensation for detrimental reliance
cannot exceed expectation losses, then a possible world consisting of
Jack the breacher and the rejected John is not a world that owes
more to Jill than one in which John is indifferent to Jill. The formula leaves the reliance interest as such to influence effectively the
quantum of damages falling below the value-expectation, as was the
case when the award for breach of promise to marry was limited to
disbursements. The upshot is that even on Fuller and Perdue's own
grounds, the fact that one passed by some good opportunities upon
contracting and later, is not an interesting fact for the assessment of
damages.
So much for the claim that lost opportunities are a matter of
importance for the measurement of contract damages. I should like
now to turn to what Fuller and Perdue have to say on lost opportunites and the general rationale (or 'motive') for any contract
damages. First consider the reliance interest itself.
The reliance interest is affected when "the plaintiff has in
reliance on the promise of the defendant changed his position.""
They write that "though reliance ordinarily results in 'losses' of an
affirmative nature (expenditures of labor and money) it is also true
that opportunities for gain may be foregone [sic] in reliance on a promise."' 2 The picture appears to be of a settled agreement with
respect to the substance of which a contractor later changes in a
direction he might not have otherwise, or does not change when
otherwise he might have. The remedy aims, in regard to the reliance
interest, "to put [the plaintiff] in as good a position as he was in
before the promise was made."' 3 In what way is the reliance interest
involved when there is a breach of contract? One perhaps had performed one's own side already and now gets nothing from the cocontractor; one had changed one's position because of the settled
agreement to one's detriment given the breach. However, satisfac*tion of the reliance interest in such post-bargain contexts will not
demand a recovery of the value-expectation of the defendant's promise; justice here will only produce an award that makes the victim
whole-typically a smaller sum.
Fuller and Perdue thus must seek reliance within the process
of contract formation itself, if they are to connect the reliance rationale to the expectation award. The idea is that a kind of reliance
11.
12.
13.

Fuller & Perdue, supra note 4, at 54.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 54.
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may exist here which will justify the recovery of an expectation.
How can that be? An act of relying must first be found. This is
achieved by citing the lost opportunities. When there is a breach
one will say that one relied upon the defendant's promise by failing
to make a satisfactory deal that was available elsewhere at the time.
The argument depends explicitly on the description of the unchosen.
options in the bargaining context as forgone in reliance on the
defendant's promise. One is thus harmed. But knowing how much
recovery to give a plaintiff for that kind of injury, involving as it
does a counterfactual claim, is unusually difficult." One turns to the
known expectation derived from the existing contract. And, in this
light, that the court will give an expectancy award "as the most ef:
fective means of compensation for detrimental reliance seems not at
all far-fetched."'" This somewhat convoluted thesis (a conjecture for
which the whole Fuller-Perdue study- is thought by many to stand)
depends explicitly upon taking "into account 'gains prevented' by
reliance, that is losses involved in foregoing [sic] the opportunity to
enter other contracts .... 1 They are employed by Fuller and Perdue to forge a link between the award (or measure) of expectancy
and the purpose (or motive) of reliance.
This link presumably-though this conclusion is not stressed
by them- would preclude any serious examination of the so-called
expectation interest, the satisfaction of which justice, in any case,
does not strongly demand. They write that "the promisee who has
actually relied on the promise . . .certainly presents a more pressing case for relief than the promisee who merely demands satisfaction for his disappointment in not getting what was promised him....
The law no longer seeks merely to heal a disturbed status quo, but
to bring into being a new situation. . . . With the transition, the
justification for legal relief loses its self-evident quality."17 The
thesis I have been examining is motivated, it would seem clear, by
the desire to bolster the justice of awarding expectation damages by
connecting them (via lost opportunities) to the self-evident need to
repair the real injuries suffered in an act of reliance.

14. Fuller and Perdue write: "This foregoing [sic] of other opportunities is involved to some extent in entering most contracts, and the impossibility of subjecting
this type of reliance to any kind of measurement may justify a categorical rule granting the value of the expectancy as the most effective way of compensating for such
losses." Fuller & Perdue, supra note 4, at 60.
15. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 4, at 60
16. Id.
17. Id. at 56.
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The Fuller-Perdue thesis consciously depends upon the existence of equivalent or better choices in the market at the time of
bargaining. The detrimental reliance that occurs there is the forgoing of alternative similar contracts, or possibly missing out some
different beneficial activity. Fuller and Perdue claim also that reducing damages in the light of mitigation "tends to corroborate the
suspicion that there lies hidden behind the protection of the expectancy a concern to compensate the plaintiff for the loss of opportunity to enter other contracts."' 8 But there is reason to doubt the
relevance of this claim. The rule of mitigation, indeed, shows a consciousness of the fact that there are often alternatives, even inferior
avenues, to the same end after a breach is suffered. But this rule
takes no interest in the options that were forgone at the time of contract formation. The rule concerns post-breach conduct and protects
the original expectancy only for what self-help was in principle
unable to salvage. Thus, if my expectation from a contract is $1,000,
but I could have dealt post-breach with another for $600 at best, my
award will be $400, whether I acted or not. Accordingly, if I could
have achieved the full contractual object by turning to another
(often emergent) opportunity, then there will be no damages at all,
even if I do nothing. What the rule effects is full compensation for
the plaintiff only when there are no available options by means of
which he can achieve his contractual end. But this so-called "duty"
to mitigate does not exist to compensate for the opportunities
forgone in the act of contract formation, and so is irrelevant to the
main Fuller-Perdue thesis.
Of course, if there were no better or equivalent options in the
market, then when one entered the contract one forwent no opportunities, and the expectation award cannot be seen to rest on one's
reliance as one bargained. So Fuller and Perdue note: "The argument that granting the value of the expectancy merely compensates
for the loss [of bargaining opportunities], loses force to the extent
that actual conditions depart from those of. . ." a perfect market. 9
But this is an uncommon situation in commercial contexts where expectation damages are awarded most often; in any case, the reliance
interest will still be relevant regarding the plaintiffs post-bargain
behavior, though by rights, recovery here should only be such as to
make one whole again. It would follow on their view, I believe, that
if the plaintiff demonstrably forwent no opportunities and suffered

18.
19.

Id. at 61.
Id. at 62.
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no subsequent loss in reliance, then the claim for the valueexpectation will either not be strong or be based simply upon
generalized support for the practice itself.2°
Fuller and Perdue suggest the following: "We might easily
base the whole law of contract on a fundamental premise that only
those promises which have been relied on will be enforced. As the
chief exception to this principle we should have to list the bilateral
business agreement. The rationale for this exception could be found
in the fact that in such agreements reliance is extremely likely to
occur and extremely difficult to prove."'" As a way of bringing the
bilateral business agreement into the fold of reliance, they suggest
the idea of a judically conferred "conclusive presumption" of
reliance." But one should not fail to notice that the reason that
reliance is so likely, but so hard to show in the business context, is
the elusive nature of missed and forgone opportunities. This completes their central (but rather couched) argument. If there is reason
to doubt that the losing of opportunities as one bargains is
something that results from reliance on a promise, then there is
reason to doubt the Fuller-Perdue thesis, the "suggestion that the
expectation interest is adopted as a kind of surrogate for the
reliance interest because of the difficulty of proving reliance.
*"23
It is now time to raise these doubts.
Fuller and Perdue introduce a distinction about reliance which
complicates the picture in this way. One may change one's position
in "essential reliance" or in "incidental reliance" on a promise. In
essential reliance one does those "acts necessary to the perfection of
[one's] rights on the contract .
,,."
Incidental reliance consists in
other kinds of acts done "naturally from the contract."" This latter
sort would all seem to be post-bargain acts of reliance, performed according to the picture of a settled contract upon which one depends
in changing position. Essential reliance, one gathers, may appear in
the process of making the bargain or contract, as well as afterwards.
"For example," they write, "the buyer under a contract for the sale
of the land has incurred expense in the investigation of the seller's

20. "The rule enforcing the unrelied-upon promise finds the same justification
['asa prophylaxis'] . ..as an ordinance which fines a man for driving through a stoplight when no other vehicle is in sight." Fuller & Perdue, supra note 4, at 61.
21. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 4, at 70.
22. See id.
23. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 4, at 64-65.
24. Id. at 78.
25. Id.
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title, or has neglected the opportunity to enter other contracts."2
The title search expense is both essential reliance and post-bargain.
The neglect of opportunities, however, could happen either essentially or incidentally, depending on whether it perfects rights. Neglecting opportunities would be essential (to the perfection of one's
rights) when it occurs upon contract formation. So the neglect of opportunities would seem to be the kind of thing that will occur immediately (in the act of contract formation) as well as in post-bargain
reliance on the formed contract. Here I should like to add a compatible dimension to their analysis, familiar from my antecedent
discussion. Any "essential" neglect of options (among which will
probably have been some opportunities) is a logical result of any
normative commitment, because every option cannot be chosen. It
does not, of course, follow that these unselected options will
evaporate. If they do, then they are lost in the non-normative way,
gone or taken by someone else. But if they remain, they are forgone
or lost only in the juristic or normative sense. One is bound not to
take them. Using these distinctions about the missing of opportunities through reliance, let me work with some more examples.
(a) The following year-I've given up on trees-I received
three offers from Christmas ornament wholesalers. I thought things
over and accepted the offer from Red, rejecting those of White and
Blue. I lost these alternatives (they were probably equivalent
though possibly superior) as I accepted Red's offer. The loss was due
to my commitment, for I bound myself otherwise than to White or
Blue. This kind of reliance (so-called by Fuller and Perdue) 'perfects
my countractual rights' within the process of entering the contract.
The reliance that produced this loss of opportunity may be
described now as essential, immediate, and normative.
(b) When I accepted Red's offer, White disappeared and Blue
delivered everything to another retailer. They are now lost to me in
the non-normative way, for I could not retrieve them even if I slipped my bonds. Such a loss is not essential to the perfection of my
contractual rights. Reliance here therefore produces loss of opportunity incidentally, in post-bargain time, and non-normatively.
(c) White returns from nowhere and persists in making fresh
good offers. I reject them all, saying I made my deal with Red.
Missing his offers will not perfect my present rights, for the only
way I could accept one of them, barring a release from Red, is by a
breach of my contract. Since I am relying on the existing contract,
26.

Id. at 54.
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my forbearance to deal with White is normative, and is no part of a
"neglect" that occurs as one contracts. These opportunities I have
lost by a reliance that is incidential, post-bargain, and normative.
(d) In contracting with Red, he required me to promise not
only to buy the ornaments, but to buy no additional ones, which I
might later require, from White or Blue. Assuming that this is a
legal contract term, it means that I have normatively lost certain opportunities to supplement my future inventory. I must forbear these
external purchases to perfect, or at least, retain my rights on the
contract. This has the same post-bargain structure as the title
search example given by Fuller and Perdue. So the reliance producing the loss of opportunity is essential, post-bargain, and normative.
(There seem to be no cases of the remaining combinations. By
definition, there are no incidentally lost opportunities within the
process of contract formation itself. The category of purely nonnormative loss essential to the perfection of rights is also empty.)
I believe that one can raise an immediate objection to the way
Fuller and Perdue would describe case (a), where I simply accepted
Red's offer and rejected White and Blue. This objection attacks a
fundamental aspect of their reliance thesis. I have noted that
refused options are a logical result of any choice or normative commitment that one makes. But has one forgone such options or changed one's position in reliance on a promise from the defendant? One
has not. The fallacy in thinking that one has relied on a promise is
clearly shown in another example Fuller and Perdue give of this socalled essential reliance given in the process of contract formation:
it is "the performance of the act requested by an offer for a
unilateral contract, and preparations to perform [the act of acceptance] ....
"' There are indeed changes of position by the plaintiffto-be (in performing the action that forms a unilateral contract or in
preparing to), but these are not changes in reliance on a promise.
The reason is that offers are only conditional promises. Before the
condition or request is met, there is no promise upon which reliance
can be placed. Whatever form acceptance takes, it is not correctly
described as 'perfecting rights'. An act of acceptance creates rights,
upon which reliance can then be placed in the post-bargain context.
In case (a) I chose Red. In Fuller and Perdue's mistaken conception,
by that act I relied essentially on Red's promise. But if there is no
promise until there is acceptance, then my change of position is not
given in reliance on Red's promise. I conclude that there simply is
27.

Id. at 78.
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no such thing as essential reliance on a promise in the process of
contract formation. This conclusion has serious consequences, which
I will elaborate shortly, for the Fuller-Perdue thesis.
Case (b) found me isolated. White left town and Blue sold out.
Is the loss of those opportunities to be described as a reliance loss
(incidential, post-bargain, and non-normative)? They are remote consequences of the fact that I signed with Red. They result from someone else's awareness of my contract; they are not changes made by
me in reliance upon the contract. That removes them as well from
the proper category of reliance losses.
Case (c) has White knocking on my door again. Now I do rely
normatively on my contract with Red and turn White away. It is incidental to my rights (rejecting him does not perfect them), and occurs in post-bargain time. It is not an instance of reliance occurring
in the process of contract formation.
Case (d) can also be described as reliance on a contract or promise. I deal only with Red, as I had promised to do. This act is
essential to my rights as expressed in the agreement, having promised not to seek other supplementary opportunities. It does not
purport to be reliance occurring in the process of contract formation, either.
(e) There is another occasion for reliance, which does not occur in post-bargain time (or seem to occur in the process of bargaining). It might be called pre-bargain reliance. It should be mentioned
briefly. Say that I had once intended (long ago and far away) to
enter into the Christmas provisions business with one Green.
Without ever reaching an agreement of partnership, I relied
detrimentaly upon Green's 'temporizing assurances'. I quit my job
and pulled up some roots. It is clear that one may pass by opportunities in reliance upon a contract-in-prospect, as much as upon any
other kind of prediction. But it should also be clear that, in Charles
Fried's words: "Promissory obligation is not the only basis for
liability; principles of tort are sufficient to provide that people who
give vague assurances that cause forseeable harm to others should
make compensation."28
Of the five kinds of situation just described, reliance on a promise only occurs twice, once incidentally, in (c), when I turned White
away on the strength of my existing contract with Red and, once
essentially, in (d), when I did not supplement my inventory through
external bargains. Contractual reliance occurs only in post-bargain
28.

C.

FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE
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contexts, when it is reliance on a promise. The idea of relying on the
promise of one's co-contractor as one forms a contract with that
party is an incoherent idea. Therefore there is reason to doubt the
Fuller-Perdue thesis. Of course not all opportunities lost in the postbargain context are reliance losses; there are the "evaporations" of
(b), occurring as they did independently of my reliance on the existing contract. But why, in any case, must the Fuller-Perdue thesis
depend upon an idea of reliance on a promise in the act of contract
formation?
For one thing (though this consideration is not made explicit by
Fuller and Perdue), there is an unseemliness in citing one's own
fidelity, occurring in a post-bargain context, as a kind of injury for
which compensation should be paid. Furthermore, if one wishes to
stress plain reliance losses, such as disbursements, then the expectation award is not appropriate. No, in order to forge the connection
the authors want between the reliance interest and the expectation
award (with the reduced appeal to an expectation interest), they
must find reliance in the act of contract formation itself. It is that
idea about which these doubts are expressed.
Now it may be said that my argument against Fuller and Perdue takes too seriously their claim that the act of contract formation
is an act of reliance on a promise. It might be noticed that a contractor does change position in the act of accepting an offer. That
change of position, it might be said, is an act of reliance on an offer,
a main consequence of which is almost always forgoing other options. One immmediate observation is this. If that argument for
reliance were sound, then no contract could be described as
"unrelied-upon" unless the contractor forwent no opportunities, as
when the best possible bargain is made. It would follow that when
one choses among several practically equivalent options one
automatically shows reliance. Or one may show reliance by restricting one's choices to inferior options. But one will not be able to
show reliance if one is fortunate enough to select the very best.
However, I will not rest my case directly on these paradoxes. Let
me step back and argue more commensensically. When I chose to
deal with Red I forwent to contract with White and Blue. Perhaps a
right characterization of this event will save the Fuller-Perdue
thesis. The heart of the matter is merely that in dealing with Red, I
suffered the detriment of missing the opportunity involved in an
alternative deal.
Once again it should be noticed that this a detriment I experience even though Red performs, because it occurs independently
of what Red does subsequently. But of course one only tends to
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think of White and Blue should a breach happen, and a law suit
mounted. But I shall ignore that mild paradox. The issue comes
down to this: Can Fuller and Perdue make the link that they want
between expectation award and reliance interest if they follow this
suggestion and speak not of reliance on a promise in the act of contract formation but of reliance on an offer? It should be remembered
that Fuller and Perdue wrote: ". . . the plaintiff has in reliance on
the promise of the defendant changed his position."" While accepting an offer is a change of position, is that sufficient to establish
that there is also an act of reliance? Two things are quite clear: this
is not reliance on a promise (which occurs anyway only in postbargain contexts), and it is not reliance on a mere contract-inprospect (prior to any offer). It is well to notice in any case that
neither of these proper occasions of reliance will justify the expectation award.' To evaluate the question, one must determine what it
is that one relies upon when one relies upon an offer. This would appear to take one of two forms. First, there is reliance during the life
of an offer (that is, after it is made but before it is accepted or
withdrawn) and, second, there is reliance within the act of contract
acceptance or formation itself. With respect to reliance during the
life of an offer, injury here would at best bring a reliance award;
justice may require that one be made whole for disbursements,
when one was led to believe that an offer would be left open. So the
real issue resolves itself to the meaning of the expression 'reliance
on an offer' and the relevance of this to the expectation award. One
says: by the act of acceptance an offeree exhibits a kind of reliance
that will justify the award of expectation damages. Now surely the
cat is out. Of what use is the notion of reliance here at all? Why not
simply say, as is always said, that by an act of acceptance an offeree
does what will justify an award of expectation damages? A contract
is formed. The appeal to reliance here may cause one to think of opportunities forgone or missed. But that is a rhetorical purpose, serving the honorable end of putting one's conduct in a favorable light,
something that must seem necessary to those who hold the expectation interest in low esteem.
29. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 4, at 54.
30. A substantial portion of "The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages" is
devoted to the question of the quantum of damages for reliance prior to contract formation. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 4, at 64f. Fuller and Perdue do not favor the
expectation award in these situations; the concluding words of the whole essay are "... we
cannot solve the problem of reimbursing reliance simply by converting the relied-on
promise into a 'contract' like every other contract. The need for compensating reliance
must be treated as a distinct promissory interest, deserving recognition on its own account." Fuller & Perdue, supra note 7, at 420.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol17/iss4/6

Bronaugh: Lost Opportunities and Contract Damages

CONTRIBUTOR'S COMMENTS
WONG V. TABOR:
COUNTERSUITS

THE LATEST

WORD

IN PHYSICIAN-ATTORNEY

Jean M. Rawson
THE UNPROMULGATED RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE:
FOR RE-EXAMINATION OF OLD TRADITIONS
David M. Hamacher
Bruce A. Lambka

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1983

A PLEA

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 4 [1983], Art. 6

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol17/iss4/6

